Pace Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 Fall 2016

Article 10

March 2017

Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in the Use of Stingray Technology: Is
New York Behind?
Samantha Hazen
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, shazen@law.pace.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons,
Science and Technology Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Samantha Hazen, Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in the Use of Stingray Technology: Is New York
Behind?, 37 Pace L. Rev. 352 (2017)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in
the Use of Stingray Technology: Is
New York Behind?
Samantha Hazen*
I. Introduction
The word “Stingray” likely does not resonate with citizens
as something other than a marine animal. But in the realm of
privacy, the word carries a much different (perhaps more
dangerous) meaning. Stingray devices belong to a family of
cell-site simulators that track a cell phone user’s location.1
Federal, state, and local agencies purchase these devices and
use them during investigations to pinpoint a suspect’s
location.2 The devices—which are the size of a briefcase—act
as cell phone towers and gather enough identifying information
to locate the suspect.3
Despite its obvious advantage of promoting security, the
technology also plays a controversial role: detecting and
tracking cell phones besides the suspect’s.4 The idea of
tracking multiple cell phones in a given region raises privacy
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University. Seeing my work in print is a very humbling experience, and I
owe this opportunity to Pace Law Review. I would like to thank Professor
David N. Dorfman and Professor Bennett L. Gershman for providing
guidance and for listening to my ideas in this ever-developing field. I am
forever thankful to those who have stuck by my side, not only as I worked on
this paper, but throughout law school as well.
1. Ryan Gallagher, Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/.
2. Stingray
Tracking
Devices,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/stingray-tracking-devices (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
3. Legislative Memo: In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of
Stingrays,
N.Y.
CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION
(Aug.
24,
2015),
http://www.nyclu.org/content/support-of-warrant-requirement-use-ofstingrays [hereinafter Legislative Memo].
4. Id.

352
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concerns and other questions.5 For example, what do agencies
do with the location information?
Do they delete the
information, or store it indefinitely? Should bystanders be
concerned that agencies will access their calls and text
messages?
The United States Department of Justice
[hereinafter “DOJ”] acknowledged these concerns and
introduced a new policy on September 3, 2015 for federal
agencies’ use of the technology.6
The DOJ’s new policy prioritizes “transparency and
accountability,” which ultimately “increase[s] privacy” for
citizens.7 In the past, federal law enforcement agencies simply
needed “legal authorization[]” to use cell-site simulators under
the federal Pen Register Statute.8 Now, federal agents must
apply for a “search warrant supported by probable cause”
before using the devices.9 The warrant requirement is waived,
however, in exigent or exceptional circumstances.10 The DOJ
also revealed that it will delete data as soon as the suspect is
found, and it will not collect data such as text messages and
emails.11 In its policy, the DOJ explained that cell-site

5. See Julia Edwards, Justice Department Tightens Cellphone Tracking
Rules,
REUTERS
(Sept.
3,
2015,
9:12
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/04/us-usa-justice-mobilephoneidUSKCN0R32B420150904#2GlQ782uO0Rs9JBv.97.
6. Id.
7. Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site
Simulators,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.
(Sept.
3,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policyuse-cell-site-simulators [hereinafter Justice Department Announces].
8. Id. See Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site
Simulator Technology, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [hereinafter Department of
Justice Policy Guidance].
9. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7.
10. Id. Exigent circumstances exist when “the needs of law enforcement
[are] so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013) (citations omitted)
(holding that officers may sometimes conduct a warrantless search “to
prevent the imminent destruction of justice”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (finding exigent circumstances when officers tend to
“persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury”); United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (holding that officers did not
need a warrant to re-enter the suspect’s home during a “chase”).
11. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7.
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simulators are not to be confused with a global-positioning
system (GPS) because cell-site simulators “do not obtain or
download any location information from the device or its
applications.”12 The DOJ also stated that cell-site simulators
“must be configured as pen registers” and accord with relevant
statutory provisions, including 18 U.S.C. § 3127.13 Finally, the
DOJ emphasized that the policy “is intended only to improve
the internal management of the Department of Justice. It is
not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, trust, or
responsibility, whether substantive or procedural, enforceable
at law . . . [or] any right of review in an administrative,
judicial, or any other proceeding.”14
One month later, the United States Department of
Homeland Security [hereinafter “DHS”] followed the DOJ’s
lead and implemented a probable cause requirement for the
use of cell-site simulators.15 Similar to the DOJ’s policy, the
DHS will not require its agents to seek warrants supported by
probable cause in exigent or exceptional circumstances.16 The
12. Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 3. But see
infra note 132. Despite the DOJ’s distinction, the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Jones still regarded the use of GPS as a search
requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. See generally United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
13. Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 2. For a
discussion of pen register use and the Fourth Amendment, see Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that “[t]he installation and use of a
pen register. . . was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required”). Only
seven years after Smith, however, Congress limited pen register use through
various statutes, indicating that pen registers should not go unregulated.
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME 112 n.3 (5th ed. 2013).
14. Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 2 n.2.
15. Department Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator
Technology, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%20Policy%2
0Regarding%20the%20Use%20of%20CellSite%20Simulator%20Technology.pdf [hereinafter Department Policy].
16. Id. See supra note 10 for examples of exigent circumstances. The
DHS also lists the following: “the need to protect human life or avert serious
injury; the prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence; the hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by a suspect or convicted
fugitive from justice.”
Id.
For exceptional circumstances, including
“potential uses of the technology in furtherance of protective duties pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3056 and 18 U.S.C. § 3056A,” agents are required to “obtain
approval from executive-level personnel at the Component’s [DHS’s]

3
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DHS makes clear, however, that its agents must still obtain
judicial approval pursuant to the Pen Register Statute and
must comply with the statute’s emergency provisions.17 When
submitting applications to the court, DHS agents “must
disclose appropriately and accurately the underlying purpose
and activities for which an order or authorization is sought.”18
The agents must also explain, with specificity, their desired
technique, their goal in using the technology, any disruptions
in cellular service, and their method of collecting and deleting
data.19 The new policy echoes the DOJ’s policy by affording
privacy to citizens and assuring their civil liberties are not
violated through the use of advanced technology.20
The United States Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter
“IRS”] became the third federal agency to rethink its cell-site
simulator policy before the end of 2015.21 John A. Koskinen,
IRS Commissioner, provided details about the agency’s cell-site
simulator use, which began in 2011.22 In a letter to United
States Senator Ron Wyden, Koskinen wrote that the IRS’s
Criminal Investigation division [hereinafter “IRS-CI”]
currently owns one simulator, but is actively seeking another.23
The IRS-CI first used its simulator during “early 2012” and has
since tracked thirty-seven cell phones “in support of eleven
federal grand jury investigations.”24 Koskinen wrote that the
agency also used the simulator during a Drug Enforcement
Agency [hereinafter “DEA”] action.25 In sum, the DOJ’s
September 2015 policy spurred change within the IRS.26 The
agency decided that it would “mirror the DOJ policy’s
headquarters and the relevant U.S. Attorney, who coordinates approval
within the Department of Justice.” Id.
17. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3125 (2012).
18. Department Policy, supra note 15.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Letter from John A. Koskinen, IRS Comm’r, to Ron Wyden, U.S
Senator
(Nov.
25,
2015),
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=6c9cd25c-28d1-4cda-919904a15c0b5d33&download=1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Letter from John A. Koskinen, supra note 21.
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requirement[s]” and draft a new policy by November 30, 2015.27
While these new policies represent a big step toward
privacy and transparency in information-gathering, they do not
extend as far as many would prefer. In fact, the DOJ’s policy
does not apply to state and local law enforcement agencies,
unless the DOJ uses the devices “in support of” these other
agencies.28 The DHS’s new policy, too, only applies to the
actions of its own agents, though the DHS recognizes that its
agents often work with state and local governments.29
According to a map created by the American Civil Liberties
Union [hereinafter “ACLU”], “57 agencies in 22 states and the
District of Columbia” use Stingray technology.30 The ACLU’s
map differentiates among states that use cell-site simulators at
the local level, the state level, or both. 31 Some of these states,
including Washington and Virginia, have a warrant
requirement, but many do not.32 Most recently, in October
2015, California implemented a warrant requirement for access
to “electronic communication information,” which includes
“location of the sender or recipients at any point during the
communication.”33 New York, which uses Stingrays at the local
and state levels,34 does not have a Stingray policy that requires
warrants supported by probable cause.35
27. Id.
28. Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department: Agencies Need Warrant to Use
Cellphone
Trackers,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
3,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-departmentagencies-will-have-to-obtain-warrant-before-using-cellphone-surveillancetechnology/2015/09/03/08e44b70-5255-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html;
Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 6.
29. Department Policy, supra note 15.
30. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-gotthem#agencies (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Stingray Tracking
Devices].
31. Id.
32. Cyrus Farivar, Cops Must Now Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays in
Washington State, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 9:49 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/cops-must-now-get-a-warrant-touse-stingrays-in-washington-state/. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.270
(2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-56.2 (2012).
33. S.B. 178, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
34. Stingray Tracking Devices, supra note 30.
35. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New
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New York’s standard marks a striking distinction. This
Comment will argue that New York should follow the federal
agencies’ and states’ leads by imposing a warrant requirement
supported by probable cause on local and state agencies that
wish to use Stingray technology in their investigations. The
first section will explore Stingray technology and how it works.
The second section will frame the issue and describe New
York’s current standard. The third section will discuss the
judicial response to the issue and how New York courts seem to
place the burden of upholding privacy on the citizen, instead of
the government. The third section will also discuss a possible
shift in New York courts’ stance on privacy, examining a recent
dispute in Erie County that involved unauthorized Stingray
use. The fourth section will discuss the legislative response to
the issue, which consists of two state bills and a federal bill
that could change New York’s policy. The fifth and final
section will argue why New York should adopt a warrant
requirement supported by probable cause.

II. What is a Stingray?
As mentioned above, “Stingray” is just one name for a
collection of cell-site simulators.36 Cell-site simulators, also
called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
catchers, “trick . . . phones nearby into connecting to the device
in order to log the IMSI number of mobile phones in the area or
capture the content of communications.”37 Other names for the
tracking technology include Gossamer and triggerfish.38 The
York,
N.Y.
CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION
(Aug.
2015),
http://www.nyclu.org/files/memo_stingrayuse_NY_201508_final.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum: Warrant Requirement].
36. Stingray Tracking Devices, supra note 30; Harris Corporation, a
Florida-based company, manufactures Stingrays and other “surveillance
technologies” used by government agencies. See Gallagher, supra note 1.
37. Cell-Site Simulators: Frequently Asked Questions, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators/faq#faqHow-do-law-enforcement-agencies-use-cell-site-simulators? (last visited Oct.
20, 2016) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.].
38. Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police Stingray Spy Tools Can Indeed Record
Calls,
WIRED
(Oct.
28,
2015,
3:00
PM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/10/stingray-government-spy-tools-can-recordcalls-new-documents-confirm/.
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name
“Stingray”
dominates,
however,
because
its
manufacturer, Harris Corporation, reportedly has an exclusive
contract with the United States.39 According to technology
publication Ars Technica, Harris’ products “provide capabilities
that authorities claim other companies do not offer.”40
Federal, state, and local agencies may purchase cell-site
simulators from Harris Corporation or various other outlets,
including Rayzone and Atos.41 Once purchased, Stingray
installation should not be an issue, as Stingrays “can be
covertly set up virtually anywhere.”42 Stingrays use a stronger
signal than mobile service towers to force cell phones in the
area to register with the Stingray instead.43 A Stingray’s range
spans approximately 1,000 feet, but varies with antenna size
and other specifications.44 While it is not definitively clear,
some sources specify that a cell phone must be powered on for a
Stingray to track it.45
Once a cell phone registers, the Stingray can obtain the
phone’s unique ID and pinpoint its exact location—even inside
an office or residence.46 The officer or agency using the device
can then use a computer connected to the Stingray to access
the data.47 Aside from location-tracking, Stingrays also have
the capability to reveal the “content of communications.”48 The
DOJ asserts, however, that its agents cannot use Stingrays to
intercept communications, including “emails, texts, contact
lists and images.”49
Stingray use seems to have taken off in the new
millennium.50 According to Ars Technica, “[t]rademark records
39. Gallagher, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 37.
42. Gallagher, supra note 1.
43. Zetter, supra note 38.
44. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 37.
45. Id.
46. Zetter, supra note 38.
47. Matthew Keys, Exclusive: Stingray Maker Asked FCC to Block
Release of Spy Gear Manual, THEBLOT.COM (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.theblot.com/exclusive-stingray-maker-asked-fcc-to-block-releaseof-spy-gear-manual-7739514.
48. Gallagher, supra note 1.
49. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7.
50. See Gallagher, supra note 1.
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show that a registration for the Stingray was first filed in
August 2001.”51
Since then, government agencies have
frequently purchased the device, which costs approximately
$70,000 for the original or $135,000 for an updated version.52
Ars Technica estimates that cell-site simulator manufacturers
have made millions on the product since the early 2000s.53
Much controversy surrounds the use of Stingray
technology.54 News outlets and other sources frequently use
one word to describe the controversy: secrecy.55 For example,
citizens may believe that agencies only use the technology for
national security purposes, but may not know that they also
use it for local, criminal investigations.56 Citizens are not the
only ones unaware of the scope of Stingray use; the courts have
also been shielded from Stingray use in local investigations.57
For example, beginning in 2010, officers in Erie County, New
York used Stingrays forty-six times without a court order or a
warrant.58
The secrecy stems from non-disclosure agreements
between cell-site simulator manufacturers, such as Harris
Corporation, and local or state agencies.59 One example of a
non-disclosure agreement between the City of Tucson, Arizona
and Harris reads:
The City of Tucson shall not discuss, publish,
release or disclose any information pertaining to
products covered under this [non-disclosure
agreement] to any third party individual,
corporation . . . or other governmental entity
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Kim Zetter, NY Cops Used ‘Stingray’ Spy Tool 46 Times Without
Warrant, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/nycops-used-stingray-spy-tool-46-times-without-warrant/.
55. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 37.
56. Id.
57. See Zetter, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Complaint & Application for Order to Show Cause at 3, Hodai v. City
of Tucson, 2014 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 2158 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2014) (No.
C20141225).
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without the prior written consent of Harris . . . in
the event that the city receives a Public Records
request from a third party relating to any
Protected Product, or other information Harris
deems confidential, the City will notify Harris of
such a request and allow Harris to challenge any
such request in court.60
Lawyers and journalists around the country wish to
uncover and expose the details of agencies’ Stingray use so that
citizens are fully aware of the technology’s capabilities. That
endeavor becomes more difficult, however, in states like New
York, where local and state agencies can use Stingrays without
obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause.61

III. New York’s Current Standard: No Warrant
Requirement
Although the DOJ has made significant steps toward
privacy through its September 2015 policy announcement, the
policy falls short because it does not affect the states.62 Some
states, however, either have cell-site simulator policies or have
recently clarified their stances. For example, the Pennsylvania
State Police (PSP) has a fact sheet that discloses its ownership
of a cell-site simulator and explains how it is used.63 In
Raleigh, North Carolina, police department spokesperson Jim
Sughrue has stated that “departmental use of the [cell-site
simulator] technology complies with state and federal

60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Legislative Memo, supra note 3.
62. ACLU Comment on New Justice Department Guidelines for Secretive
Stingray Surveillance Devices, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-comment-new-justice-department-guidelinessecretive-stingray-surveillance-devices.
63. FAQ’s
on
Cell
Site
Simulators,
PA.
STATE
POLICE,
http://www.psp.pa.gov/publicsafety/Documents/FAQ%20CellSiteSimulators%202015%20revision3.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2016). The Pennsylvania State Police seeks a court order
“approved and signed by a Judge in either the Court of Common Pleas or the
PA Superior Court” before using the device, except in exigent circumstances.
Id.

9
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requirements.”64 Sughrue, however, did not go into further
detail.65
To date, New York does not have a Stingray policy that
requires a warrant supported by probable cause.66 The New
York Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter “NYCLU”], a non-profit
civil rights group founded in 1951, does not think warrantless
use of Stingrays in New York should continue, urging the state
to take a stance.67 On October 30, 2015 the New York City
Police Department’s [hereinafter “NYPD”] Legal Bureau
responded to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request
from NYCLU, confirming its ownership and use of cell-site
simulators without a warrant.68 This was the first time the
NYPD publicly acknowledged its use of Stingrays, showing that
it had used the technology more than 1,000 times between 2008
and May 2015.69
In its response, the NYPD stated that it does not have a
written cell-site simulator policy, but it does have a two-page
non-disclosure agreement with Harris Corporation.70 The
NYPD also stated that it follows New York’s Criminal
Procedure Law § 705 before using cell-site simulators.71 The
Criminal Procedure Law does not specifically reference
Stingrays or other cell-site simulators, but § 705.10 does
discuss the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices,72
which are instruments that record metadata.73 Metadata is a
64. Raleigh, Durham Police Using Device that Tracks Cellphone Data,
WRAL (July 28, 2014), http://www.wral.com/raleigh-durham-police-usingdevice-that-tracks-cellphone-data/13847158/.
65. Id.
66. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35.
67. Id.
68. Letter from Richard Mantellino, Lieutenant, Records Access Officer,
NYPD, to Mariko Hirose, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/NYPD%20original%20FOIL%20response%
20Stingrays.pdf.
69. NYPD Has Used Stingrays More Than 1,000 Times Since 2008, N.Y.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nypd-hasused-stingrays-more-1000-times-2008.
70. Letter from Richard Mantellino, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 705.10 (1988).
73. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE
FBI’S USE OF PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT IN 2007 THROUGH 2009 1 (2015),
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collection of “telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and other
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information that it is
transmitted by instruments or facilities . . . that carry wire or
electronic communications.”74 Similar to the cell-site simulator
policy, the DOJ states that pen register and trap and trace
devices do not record the “contents of communications.”75
Under § 705.10, an agency need only obtain a court order
supported by “reasonable suspicion” to use a pen register or
trap and trace device.76 In the Editors’ Notes, commentator
Peter Preiser notes the lower burden of proof and that the
“probable cause” standard is “constitutionally and statutorily
required for search and electronic eavesdropping warrants.”77
Finally, the NYPD listed situations where it did not apply for a
court order before it used a cell-site simulator because of
“compellingly exigent circumstances.”78
The examples,
spanning from 2008 through May 21, 2015, include kidnaping,
robbery, homicide, missing person, and stalking.79
Less than three months before the NYPD’s response, the
NYCLU published a memorandum that analyzed New York’s
eavesdropping laws, concluding that New York should require
warrants.80 The memorandum first mentions the irony of
warrantless searches in New York in light of the fact that New
York offers greater eavesdropping protection to citizens than
the United States Constitution does.81 In particular, the
NYCLU honed in on New York Penal Law § 250.05, the state’s
eavesdropping law.82 The memorandum explained that it is
unlawful to eavesdrop without a warrant issued under § 700 or
a court order issued under § 705.83 The NYCLU reads the
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/o1506.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. § 705.10.
77. Id. See also Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35,
which discusses the eavesdropping warrant requirement.
78. Letter from Richard Mantellino, supra note 68.
79. Id.
80. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35.
81. Id. at 2. (“New York’s criminal prohibition on eavesdropping is
broader than its federal counterpart.” Id.).
82. Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2016).
83. Id.
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eavesdropping law to regulate Stingrays “even when it is not
being used to eavesdrop on phone conversations and messages”
because of further definitions found in § 250.00.84 First, §
250.00(6) defines “intercepting or accessing of an electronic
communication” as “intentional acquiring, receiving, collecting,
overhearing, or recording of an electronic communication,
without the consent of the sender or intended receiver, by means
of any instrument, device or equipment. . . .”85 Next, “electronic
communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing . . . or
intelligence of any nature. . . .”86 But, as the memorandum
points out, there are exceptions to § 250.00(5), two of which
may pertain to Stingray use.87 The exception that is relevant
to this paper is (5)(c), which reads: “any communication made
through a tracking device consisting of an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement
of a person or object.”88 As the memorandum points out, this
language could be seen as exempting Stingrays from the
eavesdropping warrant requirement, as Stingrays are often
used as tracking devices.89 However, the NYCLU still believes
that this reason fails due to the New York Court of Appeals’
2009 decision in People v. Weaver,90 which is discussed in
Section III of this Comment. Finally, it is interesting to note
that the memorandum does not think Stingrays fall under
“primitive” pen register or trap and trace devices, despite the
DOJ’s statement to the contrary.91 The NYCLU does not
categorize Stingrays as such because they can do more than
pen registers and trap and trace devices, such as “capture the
unique manufacturer number and location information.”92 In
84. Id.
85. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00(6) (2003) (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 250.00(5).
87. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, at 2-3. See §§
250.00(5)(a), (c).
88. § 250.00(5)(c) (emphasis added).
89. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, at 3.
90. Id. (“Even if Stingrays were exempt as a tracking device, however,
People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433 (2009), as explained in Part II, requires law
enforcement to obtain warrants for just such tracking uses.”).
91. Id. See Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 2
(“Moreover, cell-site simulators used by the Department must be configured
as pen registers . . . ”).
92. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, at 3.
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sum, the NYCLU advocates for a warrant requirement for
Stingray use and has pointed to various applicable statutory
provisions.93
Although the NYCLU cited federal and state constitutions
as authority, it did not cite specific provisions besides a general
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.94 An
important provision to consider is Article I, Section 12 of the
New York State Constitution.95 The second paragraph reads:
The right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable interception of telephone and
telegraph communications shall not be violated,
and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only
upon oath or affirmation that there is a
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the
particular means of communication, and
particularly describing the person or persons
whose communications are to be intercepted and
the purposes thereof.96
A few things are worth noting. The first is the provision’s
reference to a telephone, considering the fact that this
provision was adopted in 1938,97 a time when telephones were
not nearly as relevant as they are today. The second is the
requisite burden of proof: reasonable belief.98 While New
York’s Fourth Amendment counterpart adds greater protection
to citizens, since the Fourth Amendment does not contain the
paragraph quoted above,99 it fails to make the necessary step in
its protection. This provision would likely put an end to New
York’s unwarranted Stingray use if it required a warrant
supported by probable cause, as opposed to an order or warrant
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1791, only protects “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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issued upon reasonable belief. Thus, although the 1938
provision is forward-looking in its paragraph about technology,
it fails to provide an appropriate basis for holding New York
state agencies accountable for unwarranted Stingray use. Let
us consider how issues of privacy and location tracking have
been decided in New York courts.

IV. Judicial Response: Burden of Privacy on the
Citizen
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States
(1961) established a framework for privacy, fully-equipped with
a two-part subjective/objective analysis: “[F]irst that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”100 This inquiry seems
like the proper starting place in looking at judicial opinions
regarding privacy, since the “Katz test” has been widely cited
and is still followed today.
New York’s unwarranted use of Stingrays may come as a
bit of a surprise, considering its strict position on location
tracking in People v. Weaver.101 In that case, a police officer
attached a GPS device to the defendant’s car (unbeknownst to
him).102 The officer did not obtain a warrant before planting
the device, which remained on the defendant’s car for sixty-five
days.103 The record did not reveal why the officers wished to
track the defendant, but the officers eventually charged and
tried him with burglary.104 The jury convicted him on both
The Appellate Division affirmed the
burglary counts.105
defendant’s conviction, holding that officers did not violate his
Fourth Amendment right by tracking him without a
warrant.106
The Appellate Division also held that the
defendant “had no greater right to relief under the State
Constitution” and that he had a “reduced expectation or
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
See generally People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1195-96.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
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privacy in the exterior of his vehicle.”107
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed. It began its
analysis by distinguishing the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in United States v. Knotts.108 In Knotts, officers placed
a beeper on a five-gallon drum of chloroform to track the
drum’s location.109 A car transported the drum across public
roads before reaching its destination at the respondent’s
cabin.110 The Court held that the defendant “undoubtedly had
the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place
insofar as the cabin was concerned,” but he had a lesser
expectation of privacy concerning the “visual observation” of
the car traveling on public roads and arriving at his cabin.111
The Court also explained that the government made “limited
use” of the beeper, ending its surveillance once the drum
“ended its automotive journey” at the defendant’s home.112 The
beeper aided law enforcement, who would not have been able
investigate the whereabouts with a naked eye, and the Court
stated that “scientific enhancement of this sort raises no
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also
raise.”113
The Weaver court did not extend Knotts’ rationale to the
present case. The court held that the only similarity between
the cases is that Mr. Weaver’s car traveled on public roads,
which anyone could have observed.114
The court found
significant the fact that the officers in Knotts used the “mere
beeper” to track the chloroform drum for only one trip.115 In
contrast, the officers in this case tracked the defendant’s car for
sixty-five days.116

107. Id.
108. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See also United
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that an individual
did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his
cellphone while traveling on a public road).
109. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 282.
112. Id. at 285.
113. Id.
114. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1198-99 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
115. Id. at 1199.
116. Id. at 1195.
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Since the United States Supreme Court had not yet
decided “whether the use of GPS by the state for the purpose of
criminal investigation constitute[d] a search under the Fourth
Amendment,”117 the court turned to New York’s Constitution as
a guide.118 Since the court found that the officers infringed
upon the defendant’s expectation of privacy when they placed
the GPS device on his vehicle and tracked his location, it thus
held that the officers’ activity constituted a “search” under the
state’s Constitution.119
Finally, the court expressed concern over the potential
abuse of advanced tracking tools, noting that “the technology is
rapidly improving so that any person or object, such as a car,
may be tracked with uncanny accuracy to virtually any interior
or exterior location, at any time and regardless of atmospheric
conditions.”120 The court ultimately held that the officers
should have obtained a warrant,121 which preserves the
valuable character of tracking technology while staying within
“judicial oversight.”122 The court also noted that no exigent
circumstance waived the warrant requirement.123
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court issued
an opinion consistent with the majority’s view in Weaver. In
United States v. Jones, the Court held that placing a GPS
device on a vehicle and tracking its movement constituted a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.124 In that case, officers
became suspicious that the defendant engaged in narcotics
trafficking, so they applied to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a search warrant to install a
GPS device on the defendant’s car.125 The court issued the
warrant, but it authorized the officers to install the device only
117. Id. at 1202. The United States Supreme Court would later address
this issue in United States v. Jones. See infra note 124.
118. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202.
119. Id.
The court cited Article 1, Section 12 as the relevant
Constitutional provision. Id.; see N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
120. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
121. Id. at 1203.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1201.
124. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). See also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
125. Id. at 948.
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in that jurisdiction and “within [ten] days.”126
The officers did not install the technology in the ten-day
window and instead decided to install it while the car was
parked in a “public parking lot” in Maryland.127 The officers
then used the GPS device to follow the car’s movements for
twenty-eight days.128 The officers also had to replace the
battery during that twenty-eight-day period, and they replaced
it while the car was parked in a different parking lot in that
state.129 The tracking culminated in various drug charges filed
against the defendant.130
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence
gathered through use of the tracking device.131 The district
court only granted the defendant’s motion in regard to tracking
the car while it was parked in a lot next to his home.132
Regarding the rest of the data, the court cited Knotts’ rationale
that the defendant had “no reasonable expectation of privacy”
while traveling on public roadways.133 At trial, the jury
convicted the defendant, and he received a life sentence.134 On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction on
the ground that the officers’ use of the tracking device in
Maryland, without a warrant, violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment right.135
The Supreme Court supported the D.C. Circuit’s holding
and offered independent reasons. The Court explained that the
Fourth Amendment protects citizens from government trespass
upon their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”136 The Court
also pointed to the government’s own statement that the
officers went beyond a plain observation of the defendant’s
vehicle when they attached the GPS device to the underbody of

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
Id.
Id. at 951 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
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the car.137 The Court thus concluded that “[b]y attaching the
device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area.”138
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.139
In the meantime, lower New York courts have weighed in
on expectations of privacy.
As tracking technology has
developed, so have the courts’ views on who bears the burden
in protecting privacy. Surprisingly, the New York courts do not
follow the path taken by the Weaver and Jones courts. The
first case in an important trilogy is People v. Hall. In that case,
the defendant was indicted on murder and assault charges.140
At trial, the defendant moved to “suppress historical cell site
location information (CSLI) for calls made over his cell phone
during the three-day period surrounding the shootings,” but
the court denied his motion.141 The jury ultimately convicted
the defendant of third-degree assault and second-degree
criminal weapon possession.142
On appeal, the First Department affirmed the defendant’s
conviction.143 The court also affirmed the lower court’s denial
of suppression on the ground that gathering the defendant’s
location information “did not violate the Fourth Amendment . .
. because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy
while traveling in public.”144 The court similarly found no
constitutional argument under New York’s Constitution.145
The court also made a statutory argument, holding that 18
U.S.C § 2703(d) (2012) did not require the government to
establish probable cause.146 This statute, however, has since
been held unconstitutional.147
137. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-52 (questioning Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282).
138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
139. Id. at 954.
140. People v. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516 (App. Div. 2011).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 517.
144. Id. at 516. In fact, the First Department cited Knotts as authority
for this contention. Id.
145. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals deemed 18 U.S.C. § 2703
unconstitutional on the ground that the statute only required officers to have
“reasonable ground” of suspicion (instead of probable cause) to obtain a
warrant. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212-16 (11th Cir. 2014),
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Finally, the First Department distinguished this case from
Weaver.148 The court considered the number of days involved in
each tracking scheme; the detectives in Weaver tracked the
defendant for sixty-five days, contrasted with “a mere 3 days”
in this case.149 It is interesting to note how the Weaver court
contrasted its case with Knotts by also using the number of
days, showing that the officers in Weaver tracked the defendant
for a much longer span of time.150 Thus, the Weaver court held
that the unwarranted tracking violated the Fourth
Amendment.151 But in Hall, the court used Weaver’s strategy
to reach a different outcome: since the officers in Hall only
tracked the defendant’s location for a few days, their activity
did not rise to the level of a “protracted surveillance” in
Weaver.152 Although Hall addresses CSLI technology instead of
Stingrays, it shows that New York courts might be returning to
the Knotts framework of lessening a citizen’s expectation of
privacy in public places.
The second case in the trilogy is People v. Moorer, which
introduces the idea that the burden of privacy might be on the
citizen, as opposed to the government agency that wishes to
gather the information and use it during investigations.153 In
that case, officers identified the defendant as a suspect in a
homicide investigation.154 They filed a request with Sprint, the
defendant’s service provider, to “ping” his phone and reveal its
Sprint, however, was unable to “ping” the
location.155
defendant’s phone because “it had been ‘powered off.’”156 The
officers filed a second request, and this time, Sprint was able to
vacated, reh’g granted 573 F. App’x 925 (Mem) (2014). Although Davis has
been vacated, pending rehearing en banc, there is nothing to indicate that §
2703 is valid law. To the contrary, the statute has pending legislation.
148. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
149. Id. at 516-17 (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1195).
150. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279).
151. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202.
152. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
153. See generally People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Monroe Cty. Ct.
2013).
154. Id. at 872.
155. Id. The officers claimed exigent circumstances because they were
investigating a homicide and they believed the suspect was going to commit
another homicide. Id.
156. Id.
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pinpoint the phone’s location to an eleven-meter radius.157 The
officers gained permission to enter and search the home where
they suspected the phone to be and they found the phone in a
backpack on the porch.158
They ultimately charged the
defendant with second-degree murder.159
Before trial, the defendant “moved to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of the ‘pinging’ of his cell phone . . . .”160
During a suppression hearing, the defendant argued that the
officers violated “both federal and state constitutional rights”
when they conducted the searches without a warrant or court
order.161 Although the court denied the government’s exigent
circumstances argument, it ultimately held that the
defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.162
The court focused its analysis on voluntary versus
involuntary actions.163 The court noted that location services in
cell-phones are pre-installed “with the owner’s consent or
knowledge,” as opposed to “physical[ly] install[ing]” a tracking
device on a citizen’s car without the person’s permission.164
The court made a sweeping policy argument about the
increased use of cell-phones and privacy implications, stating:
public ignorance about cell phone technology can
no longer be maintained in this day and age—cell
phones are voluntarily carried by their users and
may be turned on or off at will. People are not so
oblivious that they are not aware that cell
phones purchased today come with GPS
technology which can pinpoint the location of the
phone at any given time so long as it is turned on
and the GPS technology has not been deactivated
or disabled . . . By a person’s voluntary
utilization, through GPS technology, of a cell
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id. at 874-75.
Id. at 875-81.
Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
Id. at 878, 881.
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phone, a person necessarily has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the phone’s
location—vis a vis the pinging—even though he
maintains what may be a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the content of his phone
conversations.165
The court upheld the lower court’s decision, holding that
“pinging” the defendant’s cell phone did not violate his
rights.166
The court’s language about the public’s knowledge and use
of cell phones represents a stark contrast from the DOJ’s Sept.
3 policy. The DOJ policy does not say that citizens lessen their
expectations of privacy by voluntarily carrying or using their
cell phones. Rather, the DOJ explicitly shows that the
government bears the burden of privacy because it now
requires federal agencies to obtain warrants before cell-site
simulators.167 Thus, the federal agencies must prove why they
want the location information. The Hall court, however, seems
to say that citizens bear the burden of privacy and should
already know that the government can track them if their
phones are powered on. The court makes this point clear by
saying citizens enjoy “no” expectation of privacy in this context,
instead of “lessened.” It can hardly be denied that many more
citizens own technology than in past years, but the DOJ makes
clear that it still intends to achieve a balance between security
and privacy.
Following Hall’s lead, the third case in the trilogy
continued the discussion of cell phone users and their
expectations of privacy.
In People v. Wells, the officers
demonstrated exigent circumstances to “ping” the defendant’s
cell phone while investigating a shooting.168 The court denied
the defendant’s suppression motion, and also commented on
the developing debate about expectations of privacy:
Finally, in this year, 2014, it can be said that cell
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Justice Department Announces, supra note 7.
People v. Wells, 991 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
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phone users, (including non-adult users) are
aware of both the capacity for their phone to be
located by GPS, and their ability to avoid that
function by turning off their phone . . . it can no
longer be said that one can reasonably expect
that a cell phone that is turned on will have its
location remain private . . . [it] is part of the
package for cell phone users.169
Wells seems to be consistent with Hall, showing that the
burden of privacy is on the citizen. The cases seem to imply
that if someone does not want to be tracked, it is up to them to
turn off their phones, not up to the government to prove why
they need the information.
The purpose of this Comment is not to overstate the lower
New York courts’ holdings or extend their meaning beyond
what was intended. The New York courts addressed the issue
of “pinging” by cell-phone companies, not cell-site simulation
conducted by the government. However, the underlying
principles of security and privacy that can be pulled from these
cases demonstrate the differing views of New York and the
federal government. It is interesting that New York seemed to
be ahead of the federal government in upholding citizens’
privacy during location tracking. Weaver, decided in 2009, held
that location tracking via GPS constituted a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment.170 The federal government, however, did
not release its policy regarding Fourth Amendment concerns in
location tracking via cell phones until 2015.171
The New York courts’ exposure to location tracking, cell
phones, and expectations of privacy did not end after the
trilogy. In fact, it became more specific, involving Stingray
technology and continued, unwarranted use of the technology.
As noted earlier, the ACLU’s map shows that New York state
and local agencies use cell-site simulators.172 The Erie County
Sherriff’s Office, however, wanted to keep its use of Stingray

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202.
Justice Department Announces, supra note 7.
Stingray Tracking Devices, supra note 30.
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technology under wraps.173
In July 2014, the NYCLU filed a public information
request with the Erie County Sheriff’s Office to obtain
information about the office’s use of “Stingray” technology.174
After the office denied the request, the NYCLU brought an
action in the New York Supreme Court, Erie County, in
November 2014.175 The NYCLU prevailed; the court ordered
the office to release “purchase orders, a letter from the
stingrays’ manufacturer, a confidentiality agreement with [sic]
between the Sheriff’s Office and the FBI, a procedural manual
and summary reports of instances in which the device was
used.”176
The NYCLU then released its findings, which showed that
the office used the technology “at least 47 times between May
1, 2010 and October 3, 2014, including assisting other law
enforcement departments like the Monroe County Sheriff’s
Office.”177 In addition, the office obtained a court order only
one time.178 Finally, the NYCLU’s records revealed that the
confidentiality agreement with the FBI required the office to
“maintain almost secrecy over stingray records” and “dismiss
criminal prosecutions [at times] rather than risk compromising
the secrecy of how stingrays are used.”179
The New York Supreme Court’s order requiring the office
to release records shows a possible shift in New York’s stance
on privacy.
The decision shows a lack of tolerance for
unwarranted Stingray use in New York. New York courts may
rethink earlier ideas of privacy that stemmed from cases like
Moorer and Hall. Since this appears to be the first time a New
York court dealt with Stingray technology, maybe the courts
will decide future cases in accordance with the Erie County
173. See Erie County Sheriff Records Reveal Invasive Use of “Stingray”
Technology,
N.Y.
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION
(Apr.
7,
2015),
http://www.nyclu.org/news/erie-county-sheriff-records-reveal-invasive-use-ofstingray-technology [hereinafter Erie County Sheriff Records].
174. In re N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No.
2014/000206, 2015 WL 1295966, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
175. Id.
176. Erie County Sheriff Records, supra note 173.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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case.
Recently, in a case of first impression in Maryland, the
Court of Special Appeals considered whether “a cell phone—a
piece of technology so ubiquitous as to be on the person of
practically every citizen—may be transformed into a real-time
tracking device by the government without a warrant.”180 The
court held that it cannot, stating that the “people have a
reasonable expectation that their cell phones will not be used
as real-time tracking devices by law enforcement, and . . . that
people have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
real-time cell phone location information.”181 Since the state’s
use of cell-site simulator technology invoked the Fourth
Amendment, the court required more than a simple court
order; it required a warrant or “a specialized order that
[includes] a particularized showing of probable cause . . . . “182
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has yet to
decide whether Stingray technology implicates Fourth
Amendment concerns.183 However, the issue recently reached a
federal district court in Manhattan, where the court
invalidated the search of a Washington Heights apartment
after officers seized drugs they discovered through
unwarranted cell-site simulator use.184 This was a landmark
ruling, as a federal judge had never suppressed such evidence
before.185 With the issue gaining attention in the lower federal
courts, Supreme Court review may not be as far away as
before. At the very least, we do know how the Supreme Court
will handle searches of a cell phone’s contents in the future.186
180. State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 326 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 358.
183. Timothy Williams, Covert Electronic Surveillance Prompts Calls for
Transparency,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
28,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/us/stingray-covert-electronicsurveillance-prompts-calls-for-transparency.html?_r=0.
184. Benjamin Weiser, D.E.A. Needed Warrant to Track Suspect’s Phone,
Judge
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/nyregion/dea-needed-warrant-to-tracksuspects-phone-judge-says.html.
185. Id.
186. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (“Our holding,
of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search;
it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even
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Through the recent cell-site simulator case in Maryland, we
also see the state courts analyzing traditional Fourth
Amendment concepts of searches, probable cause, and
warrants, applying them to modern day location-tracking. But
New York should not wait to hear from the Court, or even its
own courts; it should invoke its legislative authority and
require warrants based on probable cause.

IV. Legislative Response: Three Pending Bills
State and federal legislators are responding to the public’s
privacy concerns in unwarranted use of Stingrays. Two bills
have been proposed in New York that would change the way its
state and local agencies use cell-site simulators. A federal bill
has also been proposed that would require all state and local
agencies to obtain warrants based on probable cause before
using the technology.
The first bill is New York Senate Bill S4914A, sponsored
by New York Senator Michael Ranzenhofer.187 The bill was
proposed on April 23, 2015 and is currently in the committee.188
The bill seeks to amend New York’s Criminal Procedure Law
section 705 by adding a seventh definition.189 A definition of
“mobile phone surveillance device or system” would include
“technology that identifies, tracks, or locates cellular devices by
forcing each compatible cellular device in a given area to
disconnect from its service provider cell site and establish a
new connection with the device by mimicking a wireless cell
tower.”190 This bill does not rise to the level of the DOJ’s
warrant requirement, but instead proposes a court order
requirement.191 The officer would only need to demonstrate
“reasonable suspicion that a designated crime has been, is
being, or is about to be committed . . .” to obtain permission to
when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”). The Riley Court cites Jones
and references a cell phone’s ability to “reconstruct someone’s specific
movements down to the minute,” id. at 2490, but the Court does not address
location-tracking in depth.
187. S.B. 4914A, 2015-2016, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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track a person’s location.192 Considering the DOJ’s and other
states’ warrant requirements, this proposed bill would still
keep New York courts behind, as it appears from the NYPD’s
statement that it does seek court orders before using the
technology.193
The second proposed bill, however, rises to the appropriate
level. New York Senate Bill 8055, introduced on June 5, 2015,
seeks to require officers to obtain a warrant based on probable
cause before using a cell site simulator to reveal a person’s
location.194 The bill seeks to amend the definitions under New
York’s eavesdropping law by adding the words “includes the
use of a cell site simulator device” after the definition of
“eavesdropping.”195 The bill also intends to add a definition for
“cell site simulator device,” which would mean “a device that
transmits or receives radio waves for the purpose of conducting
one or more of the following operations: (A) identifying,
locations, or tracking the movements of a communications
device. . . .”196 Finally, the bill wants to make sure that cell-site
simulators fit under the state’s eavesdropping laws so that they
require a warrant supported by probable cause; the bill seeks
to amend section 700.20(ii) (eavesdropping warrant
application) by adding “to the extent known for a warrant
authorizing use of a cell site simulator device.”197
In November 2015, United States Representative Jason
Chaffetz introduced the “Stingray Privacy Act of 2015,” which
would require any “governmental entity” to obtain a warrant
before using a cell-site simulator.198 His proposed bill is not
limited to federal agencies.199 The bill does not set out a
probable cause requirement, but it specifies the way in which
cell-site simulators should be used.200 For example, the bill
requires that no evidence obtained through a cell-site simulator
192. S.B. 4914A.
193. Letter from Richard Mantellino, supra note 68.
194. Assemb.
8055,
2015-2016,
Reg.
Sess.
(N.Y.
2015),
http://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2015/A8055.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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can be used during a proceeding, except if the agency obtains a
warrant, conducts electronic surveillance, or uses it during an
emergency.201 It is interesting to note that it specifically
addresses national security,202 which seems to be at the
forefront of issues facing the federal government.

V. Conclusion: New York Should Require a Warrant
The body of research surrounding cell-site simulators
indicates that the devices are another piece of technology that
our laws have not quite caught up to yet, similar to cell phone
capabilities and social networking sites. But this does not
mean that we should accept the status quo. For one, the DOJ
shows that it is paying attention to citizens’ desire for privacy,
while at the same time trying to keep these same citizens safe.
Thus, I believe that New York should follow suit and adopt a
warrant requirement supported by probable cause.
Although the results in the lower New York courts
demonstrate otherwise, I argue that the burden should be on
the government to show why it needs to invade citizens’
privacy. The Erie County revelation seemed to shock New
York citizens, which shows that it is the appropriate moment
for the state to establish an official Stingray policy with a
probable cause requirement. Other states have adopted new
policies or clarified their policies even before the DOJ did. As
the DOJ notes, there are ways to balance privacy and national
security. It is completely understandable that there are
exceptions to warrant requirements, especially in the wake of
violence within this country and overseas.
But, absent
exigency or emergency, both the federal and state governments
should obtain warrants supported by probable cause before
they employ these high-tech devices. New York should be no
different.

201. Id.
202. Id.
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